The scope-prefix concatenation cacheKey used a bare U+FFFD separator with
no escaping, so an adversarial subject/tenant id containing that character
could collide with a different subject/tenant pair and leak cached roles
across tenants. Switch to JSON.stringify([scopeKey, subjectId]) for an
unambiguous key.
Also replace the untested key.endsWith() substring sweep used to
invalidate a subject across all tenants on a global write with an
explicit bySubject index, and add test coverage for both the collision
and the cross-tenant invalidation sweep.
The plan's cachedPermissionStore used scopeKey + U+FFFD + subjectId as a
cache key with no escaping, so ('a', 'b<sep>c') and ('a<sep>b', 'c') collide
and one subject is served another's permissions. Subject and tenant ids are
unconstrained strings, so nothing prevented it.
Key is now JSON-encoded, and the global-write sweep tracks keys per subject
instead of substring-matching. Adds the two regression tests that were
missing: cross-tenant invalidation on a global write, and key collision.
Ruled by the human as plan-mandated; source of truth amended so a re-run of
the plan does not reintroduce the defect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
.superpowers/ holds git-ignored controller artifacts (briefs, reports,
review packages). Prettier still walked it, so format:check — and with it
check:production — failed on scratch markdown.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Global Constraints said the change was additive while Task 8 changed
authorizeDecision's 403 body. Ruled: the security fix governs; the
constraint now names it as the one approved exception.
- Task 6 defined permissionsFor and then re-implemented it inline in
decide. Both now call a single loadEffective helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fifteen TDD tasks covering phases 1-3 of the approved design: registry,
catalog merge, PermissionStore with a shared conformance suite, caching
decorator, audit sink, resolution engine, request middleware and guards,
router discovery, database adapter, codegen, and the wrnexus authz CLI.
Phases 4 (.wrn view can()) and 5 (admin UI) are documented as deferred with
the reason each needs its own design pass.
Also folds in the authorizeDecision disclosure fix as Task 8, since the new
guards share its 403 shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Separates declaration (what permissions, roles, policies and attributes exist)
from assignment (who holds what), building on the decision primitives already
in advanced.ts rather than replacing them.
Covers the registry and app/authz discovery, the PermissionStore interface
with memory and db adapters, tenant-scoped assignments meeting the existing
TenantMembership, deny-wins precedence, fail-closed behaviour, the audit sink,
codegen and CLI introspection, and the seam for propagating subject context to
the inter-app communication system.
Records two decisions worth keeping: cross-app sharing needs no runtime
catalog distribution (declarations are static code in the shared package;
only assignments are shared, via the database), and can() stays off Context
to avoid a core -> authz dependency cycle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audit of 0.8.4 found the repo's own gates green, so these came from manual
review; each is covered by a new regression test.
security/fetch.ts
- safeFetch re-attached Authorization/Cookie on a same-origin redirect that
followed a cross-origin hop (a -> b -> b), handing credentials to the second
host. Compare against the origin the caller trusted, not the previous hop.
- The private-network guard resolved the host, approved it, then let fetch
resolve again, so a low-TTL record could answer public for the check and
private for the connection. Pin the connection to the validated address,
preserving Host and TLS serverName. Opt out with pinDns: false.
- 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:7f00:1 and fec0::1 were not treated as
private. Add uncompressed IPv4-mapped forms, site-local IPv6, 198.18/15
and 192.0.0/24.
security/url.ts
- sanitizeUrl returned "//evil.com" verbatim via the relative-path fast path,
bypassing the host checks it had just run; in an href that navigates
cross-origin. Resolve protocol-relative input instead.
dev-server/gateway.ts
- Malformed base64 in an Authorization header threw out of checkAuth on an
unauthenticated path. Fail closed.
- split(":", 2) truncated passwords at the first colon, so a password
containing ":" could never authenticate.
- The credential compare short-circuited on length mismatch, leaking length
by timing. Extracted as verifyBasicAuth so it is testable.
authz/index.ts
- Namespace wildcards only matched the first segment, so "post:comment:*"
did not grant "post:comment:delete". Match at every depth.
uploader/operations.ts
- Validate transcoder dimensions and bitrate rather than trusting the declared
type, and reject ".." path segments.
package.json
- The brace-expansion override pinned 5.0.8, which is inside the advisory
range >=4.0.0 <5.0.9. Bump to 5.0.9; bun audit is now clean.
Verified: check:production passes (typecheck, lint, 1033 tests, format,
ASVS, public-API baseline, editor checks).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clintchiz
