Critical:
- router: fail loudly (WRN-SERVICE-COLLISION) when two app/services files
scan to the same service name, instead of silently letting directory-walk
order pick a winner.
Important:
- server.ts: wrap a throwing input schema so its raw message cannot escape
invoke(); returns RPC_INVALID and logs server-side instead.
- client.ts: race timeoutMs against transport.call so a stalled transport
cannot hang the caller; rejects with a ServiceError(RPC_TRANSPORT).
- client.ts: the proxy returns undefined for undeclared properties (incl.
then/catch/finally) instead of a function that throws, closing the
await-client thenable trap.
- gateway.ts / rpc-dispatch.ts: import RPC_PATH_PREFIX / RPC_INTERNAL_HEADER
from @wrnexus/rpc instead of hardcoding local copies.
- gateway.test.ts: cover the RPC-prefix edge block and internal-header
stripping across casing variants.
- http.test.ts / client.test.ts: cover anonymous-call header omission, the
internal marker, the retryable-status sweep, network/malformed/HTML
failures, AbortSignal propagation, the timeout path, and timer cleanup.
Minor:
- transport.ts: Object.hasOwn for handler lookup; note the entry-only abort
check.
- client.ts: wrap a missing/invalid WRNEXUS_RPC_SECRET as a ServiceError
(RPC_IDENTITY) instead of a bare Error.
- rpc/package.json: drop the unused @wrnexus/authz dependency.
- server.ts: implement() now throws at construction time if a declared
procedure has no own handler.
Verified: reverting the service-collision check and the client timeout race
each make their new test fail, then restore green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1 CRITICAL: implement() looked up procedures/handlers with plain property
indexing, so any Object.prototype member name (constructor, toString, etc.)
resolved truthy and skipped the permission gate entirely. Fixed with
Object.hasOwn checks in packages/rpc/src/server.ts. Defense-in-depth guard
added in packages/dev-server/src/rpc-dispatch.ts constraining URL path
segments to a safe charset before they reach service/procedure lookups.
Added missing direct test coverage for packages/rpc/src/transport.ts,
server.ts and client.ts (previously untested), including a prototype-name
sweep in both server.test.ts and dev-server's rpc-endpoint.test.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
server.ts looked procedures up with plain property indexing, so every
Object.prototype member resolved as truthy. A prototype member carries no
`permission`, so the permission gate was skipped entirely.
Verified: with a contract whose only procedure declares a permission and a
checkPermission that always denies, invoke("add") correctly returns
RPC_DENIED, while invoke("constructor") returns {"ok":true,"value":{"a":2}}
and the gate never runs.
Reachable over the wire as POST /__wrnexus/rpc/<service>/constructor by
anything that clears the internal-caller check - i.e. any workspace app.
Fixed at both layers: Object.hasOwn for the procedure and handler lookups,
and a character-class guard on the path segments before they are used as
lookup keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the uncommitted body of work under version control so it cannot be
lost. Gates are green: 152 tests pass across rpc/router/dev-server,
typecheck, lint, format and check:public-api all clean.
NOT YET REVIEWED. None of Tasks 5-11 has had an independent task review, and
Task 4's second fix round was never re-reviewed either.
Known gaps against the plan, recorded here rather than discovered later:
- packages/rpc/test/{transport,server,client}.test.ts are ABSENT. The plan
required a test file for each. server.ts holds the fail-closed identity and
permission checks and currently has no direct coverage at all.
- rpc-endpoint.test.ts has 3 tests where the plan specified 9. Missing:
unknown service, non-POST, malformed body, non-rpc passthrough, and the
isInternalCaller sweep. This is the task where a reachable
/__wrnexus/rpc/* makes every permission check in the workspace bypassable.
- http.test.ts has 3 of 7; integration.test.ts 2 of 3;
services-discovery.test.ts 1 of 4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
verifyJwt gates its maxAge check on iat being a number, so a token forged
without iat was honoured at any maxAgeSeconds - the same shape as the
audience and exp fail-opens closed in the previous round. A future-dated iat
did the same via a negative age. Both refused now.
The import side never checked aud was a single string, and verifyJwt compares
with includes(), so a multi-audience token verified at several apps. The
mint-side guard's invariant now holds where it is enforced.
ctx.tenant present with a null id minted an authenticated credential with no
tenant claim, which the callee reads as global. Absent ctx.tenant means
untenanted; a present tenant with an unusable id is an error.
Adds six tests pinning behaviours that mutation testing showed were free to
delete without any test noticing: no-exp, no-iat, the 300s default max age,
an array audience on import, a non-string tenant claim on import, and a null
tenant id at mint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The round-1 fix required exp and passed maxAge, but verifyJwt gates its age
check on iat being a number - the identical shape to the two fail-opens that
round closed. A token minted without iat defeats the age bound at ANY
maxAgeSeconds, and a future-dated iat yields a negative age and does the
same. Both refused now, so maxAge means what ImportOptions says it means.
The mint side refused an array targetApp, but the import side never checked
that aud was a single string, and verifyJwt compares with includes(). So a
multi-audience token still verified at several apps - the invariant was true
only where it was not enforced. Now checked at the callee.
ctx.tenant present with a null id was treated as untenanted, silently
widening scope to global while still issuing an authenticated credential.
Absent ctx.tenant means global; a present tenant with an unusable id is an
error.
Also exports ImportOptions, which the append snippet omitted although the
Produces line names it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- importSubjectContext now rejects a non-string/empty selfApp before
verifying. verifyJwt skips the audience check entirely when audience
is undefined, so an unvalidated selfApp (the natural shape of
currentAppName(): string | undefined) accepted every token from every
app for every audience.
- exportSubjectContext now rejects a non-string/empty targetApp, so an
array can no longer mint one token valid at multiple apps.
- Both directions now reject a present-but-non-string tenant id instead
of silently dropping it (was: callee reads missing tenantId as
global/unscoped -> cross-tenant exposure).
- importSubjectContext now requires exp to be present and independently
bounds accepted token age via a new maxAge/ImportOptions.maxAgeSeconds
(default 300s), so a caller cannot mint a long-lived token via a huge
ttlSeconds and have it honoured indefinitely.
- SubjectContext.callerApp doc now states it is self-asserted (the
signing secret is workspace-wide) and must never be an authz input.
- index.ts also exports the new ImportOptions type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CRITICAL: importSubjectContext never validated selfApp, and verifyJwt skips
the audience check entirely when audience is undefined. So an undefined
selfApp disabled the only cross-app binding in the system and accepted every
token from every app for every audience. Not hypothetical - the natural feed
is helpers' currentAppName(), which returns string | undefined. The mint side
already hard-fails on a missing app name; the import side did not.
A non-string tenant id was silently dropped at both ends. A numeric tenant id
is the common DB-backed case, and a callee reading a missing tenantId as
"global" is a cross-tenant exposure. Now refused, symmetric with the subject
check.
Token lifetime was unbounded: verifyJwt only checks exp when present, so a
token minted without one never expired, and a caller passing a large
ttlSeconds produced a long-lived impersonation credential the callee
honoured. exp is now required and age is bounded by maxAge independently.
targetApp was unvalidated, so passing an array minted one token valid at
several apps - exactly what the audience binding exists to prevent.
Also documents callerApp as self-asserted rather than authenticated
provenance, since the signing secret is workspace-wide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
defineService froze the procedures map but not each procedure inside it, so a
ProcedureDef built by hand rather than through procedure.build() stayed
mutable: svc.procedures.foo.permission = 'hacked' silently succeeded. The
contract is shared between two apps as a single source of truth, and the
guarantee rested on every call site remembering to use the builder.
Same class as the authz catalog's frozenMap, which froze the Map's mutators
but not the values it handed out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The builder's .input() did not typecheck as written (TS2345). The phantom
__input/__output markers make ProcedureDef invariant, which is exactly why
.output<T>() already carried a cast - .input() needed the analogous one and
did not have it.
Caught by the Task 3 implementer, who also verified via @ts-expect-error that
InferProcedureInput/InferProcedureOutput genuinely reject wrong shapes, so
the phantom markers are carrying real type information rather than silently
widening.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- isRetryableStatus now fails closed for out-of-range values (600+, negative,
NaN) by bounding the 5xx check on both sides (>= 500 && <= 599), instead of
an unbounded >= 500 that classified garbage statuses like 1000 as retryable.
- 408 Request Timeout is now retryable, matching the RPC_TRANSPORT doc
comment (connection, timeout, 5xx) — a timeout surfaced as 408 is no longer
treated differently from the same timeout surfaced as 504.
- Add RPC_MALFORMED: the callee answered, but not with a ServiceResult (HTML
error page, truncated body, unexpected shape). Distinct from RPC_TRANSPORT
since something DID respond; non-retryable via the existing retryableFor,
no new branch needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
isRetryableStatus used an unbounded status >= 500, so a garbage status like
1000 landed in the retryable bucket. This function is the sole gate the
client and HTTP transport trust for retry safety, and an out-of-range value
must fail closed. Bounded on both sides.
408 Request Timeout was non-retryable while the same file documented
transport as covering "connection, timeout, 5xx" - a genuine timeout
surfaced as 408 was classified differently from the identical timeout
surfaced as 504. Now retryable.
There was no code for "the callee answered but not with a ServiceResult" - a
proxy's HTML error page, a truncated body. Task 8 was already papering over
it by hand-setting retryable: false beside a transport code that
retryableFor says is always retryable, which is exactly how the two drift
apart. Added RPC_MALFORMED and made that path use failure() so retryability
is derived from the code rather than written next to it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Drop the redundant eslint-disable on AnyProcedures; no-explicit-any
is off repo-wide so the directive itself was the warning. Doc
comment now explains why none is needed.
- Rename test's schema binding to _schema per the lint config's
underscore-prefix rule for read-only-as-type bindings.
no-explicit-any is off repo-wide in eslint.config.js, so the disable comment
the plan mandated is itself an unused-directive warning. The test's schema
binding also needs the _ prefix the lint config requires for a value read
only via typeof.
Separately: bun test strips type-only imports before resolution, so the
red-first step does not reproduce for type-only tests. Recorded so later
implementers do not chase it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eleven TDD tasks covering phase 1: contract and immutable procedure builder,
error classification, the signed subject-context token, the Transport seam
with an in-process transport for tests, implement() with fail-closed identity
and permission checks, the typed client proxy, the HTTP transport, router
discovery of app/services, and the mounted endpoint with its two independent
external-access guards.
Phases 2-4 (retry and circuit breaking, app-to-app streaming, identity for
pubsub and queue) are documented as deferred with the reason each needs its
own design pass.
Task 10 is called out as the highest-risk: if /__wrnexus/rpc/* is reachable
from the public internet, every permission check in the workspace is
bypassable, so the plan requires the gateway block and the app-side check to
be verified as working independently of each other.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Typed request/response between workspace apps over HTTP, behind a Transport
seam so gRPC stays additive rather than a rewrite. Contracts live in the
workspace's shared package and are imported by both sides, so types flow
through a normal import with no code generator.
Consumes the exportSubjectContext/importSubjectContext seam the permissions
system reserved, with one improvement on what that seam implied: the token
carries sub and tenant only, never roles. Every app shares the
PermissionStore, so the callee resolves roles itself - a stale or forged
roles claim becomes impossible by construction and there is no path to
injecting privileges through a claim. The token authenticates; it never
authorizes.
Records two properties that are easy to get wrong and expensive to discover:
/__wrnexus/rpc/* must be unreachable from the public internet, blocked at the
gateway AND verified at the app, or every permission check in the workspace
is bypassable; and only procedures explicitly marked idempotent may be
retried, because retrying a slow createInvoice is how a customer gets billed
twice.
Deliberately does not wrap pubsub or queue - they work, and an abstraction
over working code leaks and needs keeping in sync. They gain identity
propagation instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
packages/authz gained @wrnexus/core and @wrnexus/db, and
examples/auth-showcase gained @wrnexus/authz, but no install ran afterwards
so bun.lock never recorded them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bodies of work, both reviewed before merge.
SECURITY AUDIT of 0.8.4. The repo's own gates were already green, so every
finding came from manual review and each was reproduced before being claimed:
safeFetch re-attached credentials after a cross-origin redirect; its
private-network guard was advisory only and defeated by DNS rebinding; three
IPv6 forms bypassed the private-address check; sanitizeUrl returned
protocol-relative input verbatim (open redirect); the gateway threw on
malformed Basic credentials, truncated passwords at the first colon, and
leaked password length by timing; RBAC namespace wildcards matched only the
first segment; the brace-expansion override was pinned to the exact
vulnerable version.
PERMISSIONS SYSTEM in @wrnexus/authz. Declaration catalog discovered from
app/authz, a pluggable PermissionStore with memory and sqlite adapters held
to one 24-test conformance suite, a resolution engine with deny-wins
precedence and fail-closed error handling, request middleware, an audit sink,
type codegen, a wrnexus authz CLI, and dev/prod boot wiring.
Behaviour changes needing release notes: authorizeDecision's 403 body no
longer carries reason or policy (opt back in with exposeReason); RBAC
wildcards now match at every depth, which widens access for anyone relying on
the old behaviour; Router gained a required authz field; subject.id must be a
non-empty string. See docs/plans/2026-08-05-authz-follow-ups.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Findings from the task and whole-branch reviews that were ruled non-blocking,
plus the behaviour changes that need release notes. None is an authorization
bypass. Recorded in the repo because the review workspace is scratch and git
history does not carry the reasoning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
frozenMap only blocked the Map's own mutators, so
catalog.roles.get("editor").push("*") escalated a role to a full wildcard
past an error string claiming the catalog is frozen after boot; the same
applied to permission/attribute metadata objects and binding arrays.
mergeCatalogs now stores frozen copies of each, so the original declaring
module's objects are never mutated either.
Also corrects two docstrings (codegen.ts, the design doc) that claimed
`wrnexus authz generate`'s output makes a permission typo a type error —
can(), guardPermission(), and decideFor() all take a bare string and nothing
consumes the generated union automatically. Documents what it actually is:
a Permission/Role union to type your own helpers/constants against. Also
adds a README note on the subject.id contract (must be a non-empty string;
owner() compares with Object.is).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
guardPermission's getResource catch returned 403 directly, never reaching
decideFor -> decide -> finish, so the audit sink never saw it — an attacker
probing ids that make the resource loader throw got a clean 403 stream
invisible to the audit trail. The audit sink is now stashed on the
per-request RequestAuthz object (authzMiddleware already receives it via
AuthzResolverOptions), and the catch records an "allowed: false" event with
an opaque reason before returning the 403.
Also: the explicit-deny check sat outside decide()'s try/catch, and
deniedBy() guarded on denies.length rather than Array.isArray(denies). A
store returning denies as a bare string let new Set(denies) iterate
characters instead of the permission, so the deny matched nothing and was
silently discarded; a store omitting denies entirely threw straight out of
decide(). Both are now validated and handled inside the try, denying via the
same "Authorization store unavailable" path as any other store failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
createProductionHandlers called setAuthzCatalog unconditionally, so a caller
using client.ts's documented escape hatch (setAuthzCatalog(catalog) before
importing anything that reads it) had that catalog silently wiped to empty
whenever opts.authz was omitted. Now only sets when opts.authz has entries to
contribute, or when nothing has been set yet; a non-empty opts.authz still
always sets and still throws on a genuine conflict.
Also removes RuntimeDeps.authz: nothing read it, and its doc comment
described a consumer that doesn't exist. The real wiring is
getAuthzCatalog()/setAuthzCatalog(), including the HMR hot-update path, which
is untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 15 of the authz permissions plan: proves db store + cache + catalog +
middleware + audit compose correctly, wires a real (non-dangling) example
into auth-showcase, and documents the declaration/registration/precedence
surface in the package README.
Fix round 2 for Task 14, addressing a critical review finding reproduced on
a real built server.
C1 (critical): the generated production entry set the authz catalog inside
createProductionServer's BODY, but ES modules evaluate every static import
(including app middleware, emitted as a static import) before the importing
module's body runs. Middleware reading getAuthzCatalog() at module scope —
the same eager shape authzMiddleware({ catalog, ... }) itself requires, and
the pattern app/middleware/logger.ts's `export default requestLogger({...})`
already uses — saw an unset catalog and crashed the whole process at import
time, after every other gate (typecheck/lint/tests/a plain `bun run build`)
stayed green.
Fix: packages/cli/src/build.ts now emits a small side-effecting
`.authz-setup.ts` module containing the static imports of every
app/authz/*.ts declaration plus a call to the new
applyAuthzManifestEarly(entries) (packages/dev-server/src/prod.ts), and
imports THAT MODULE FIRST in the generated entry — before pages, api,
realtime, middleware, components, and layouts. applyAuthzManifestEarly is
deliberately silent (no missing-default-export warnings, though a genuine
conflict still throws and fails the boot at import time); createProductionHandlers
keeps its own unconditional merge+set as an idempotent, always-warning second
pass, so an adapter that bypasses the generated entry and calls it directly
still gets a correctly merged, validated catalog, and so the function stays
independently testable.
I3: corrected packages/authz/src/client.ts's WRN-AUTHZ-SETUP message, which
claimed prod always sets the catalog before middleware runs — true again for
the generated entry after the C1 fix, but not for a custom entry that calls
createProductionHandlers directly.
I2: dev HMR editing app/authz/*.ts reloaded the page while the OLD catalog
stayed authoritative (watch.ts classifies any non-CSS change as "server";
hotUpdate had no authz/ branch) — a false security signal, since tightening
or removing a permission looked like it took effect but didn't until a
restart. Added the branch (packages/dev-server/src/index.ts), and gave
loadAppAuthzCatalog (authz-boot.ts) an injectable importer: a raw import()
would have silently no-op'd on the re-import (Bun caches local TS/JS modules
by filesystem path and ignores query strings), so the hot path routes through
loadModule (pipeline.ts) instead, which copies the edited file to a versioned
sibling specifically to defeat that cache.
I4: added direct createProductionHandlers/applyAuthzManifestEarly tests
(packages/dev-server/test/authz-prod.test.ts: conflict throws naming both
files, missing default export warns and skips, empty array yields an empty
catalog, a second call re-validates rather than trusting a stale singleton)
and the regression test that matters most
(packages/cli/test/authz-prod-coldstart.test.ts): a real `runBuild` + a real
`bun dist/server.js` boot, with a middleware module reading
getAuthzCatalog() at module scope, asserting it actually serves a request.
M5: startServer built its own router once, then loadAppAuthzCatalog built a
second one from scratch on every dev boot and every authz/ hot reload.
loadAppAuthzCatalog now accepts either an appDir (still used standalone, e.g.
by the test suite) or an already-built Router, and both call sites in
index.ts now pass the router they already have.
Every fix in this round was verified non-vacuous by sabotaging it and
confirming the corresponding test fails, then reverting.
Fix round 1 for Task 14 — closes the gap flagged in the last report:
loadAppAuthzCatalog existed but nothing called it.
- packages/authz/src/client.ts (new): setAuthzCatalog/getAuthzCatalog/
hasAuthzCatalog, mirroring @wrnexus/db's client.ts. App middleware runs
at module-eval time and needs the catalog then, so ctx cannot carry it;
getAuthzCatalog() throws a setup error naming the fix, like getDb() does.
Exported from packages/authz/src/index.ts.
- packages/dev-server/src/index.ts: startServer calls loadAppAuthzCatalog +
setAuthzCatalog before middleware is resolved (schemasJs precedent),
and populates the new RuntimeDeps.authz field.
- packages/dev-server/src/runtime.ts: RuntimeDeps gains authz?: AuthzCatalog.
- packages/cli/src/build.ts: emits static imports of each app/authz/*.ts
file into the generated entry (components/layouts precedent) and passes
{ source, module } pairs through ProdOptions.authz — the catalog holds
policy functions, so it cannot be JSON-baked like schemasJs.
- packages/dev-server/src/prod.ts: createProductionHandlers merges those
declarations and calls setAuthzCatalog before the server accepts
traffic, so a conflict fails the boot instead of surfacing on the first
request. Runs for every deployment adapter, not only Bun.serve.
The framework never installs authzMiddleware itself; the app still
registers it with its own store.
Verified end-to-end: added a temporary app/authz declaration to
examples/basic-app, ran `bun run build`, inspected the generated entry's
static import + authz array, and booted dist/server.js to confirm the
merge/setAuthzCatalog call succeeds against real bundled code (reverted
before commit).
Adds loadAppAuthzCatalog(appDir) to @wrnexus/dev-server: discovers
app/authz/*.ts declarations via buildRouter, imports and merges them
into an AuthzCatalog, returning an empty catalog when the app has no
declarations. A declaration with no default export is skipped with a
warning; a genuine conflict between two declarations throws
WRN-AUTHZ-CONFLICT naming both source files.
Declared the missing @wrnexus/authz workspace dependency in
dev-server's package.json.
Round-1 review fixes for Task 13:
- packages/cli/package.json was missing @wrnexus/authz, and
packages/authz/package.json was missing @wrnexus/core despite importing
its types in index.ts/middleware.ts/advanced.ts. Both only worked
in-repo because bare "@wrnexus/*" specifiers resolve through the root
tsconfig.json paths map; a standalone install of @wrnexus/cli or
@wrnexus/authz would fail at runtime.
- authz.ts's unknown/missing-subcommand and bad --dialect paths now
console.error + process.exit(1), matching db.ts's convention, instead
of throwing — index.ts's top-level catch previously printed those as a
raw stack trace. Added a subprocess-level test that spawns the real CLI
and asserts stderr has the usage line with no stack frame.
- nextMigrationNumber now extracts the leading-digit run the same way
db/migrate.ts's nextNumber does, instead of a fixed slice(0, 4) that
would have undercounted once a migration number passed 9999.
Introspects the merged authz catalog, emits app/authz/permissions.gen.ts
type unions, and scaffolds the assignment-table migration. init validates
--dialect explicitly (unrecognised values reject rather than silently
falling back to sqlite) and joins authzMigrationSql's up/down statement
lists with terminators instead of interpolating the arrays.
Test scaffolding for dynamically-imported app/authz declarations must
live inside the repo tree (not os.tmpdir()) for the "@wrnexus/*" bare
specifier to resolve via tsconfig paths; .gitignore excludes the scratch
dirs this produces.
authzMigrationSql was changed in Task 11 to return statement arrays rather
than one blob, but Task 13's init still interpolated them straight into the
migration file, which would comma-join two CREATE TABLE statements into one
unparseable line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan's union helper hand-rolled escaping for backslash and double quote
only. Role names reach the emitter through the raw mergeCatalogs path, which
does not apply the registry's permission-id regex, so a value containing a
newline was emitted verbatim and the generated file failed to compile with
TS1002 Unterminated string literal.
Caught by the Task 12 implementer actually running tsc over the generated
output rather than eyeballing the string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Emits sorted TS unions from the merged catalog so a typo in
can(ctx, "post:wrtie") is a compile-time error. Uses JSON.stringify
for string-literal escaping (not manual backslash/quote replace) so
role names containing raw newlines still produce valid TypeScript;
role names are not regex-validated like permission ids, so this
matters for the raw mergeCatalogs path.
N1: scopeKey guarded the empty-string VALUE but not the TYPE. A
non-string tenantId (null, 0, false, an object) flowed through
un-normalised, and the adapters disagreed about the result - db
rejects null on NOT NULL, memory accepts it as an unreachable row; 0
and false stringify differently and could collide. Now
`typeof tenantId !== "string" || tenantId === ""` is refused with the
same WRN-AUTHZ-SCOPE error. Added a conformance case covering
null/0/false/{}.
N2: nothing failed if grant() were re-wrapped in db.tx, reintroducing
the shared-connection rollback from C1/C2 - timing-based tests can't
reliably prove a transaction is never opened. Added
db-no-transaction.test.ts: a fake Db with a spied driver.transaction
and statement-recording all/exec, driving every PermissionStore method
and asserting zero transaction calls and no "BEGIN" in any recorded
statement. Verified it fails when grant() is temporarily re-wrapped in
db.tx, then restored.
Also documents two things in db.ts as comments only: the UNIQUE
constraints are now load-bearing for ON CONFLICT/ON DUPLICATE KEY
target inference, and MySQL's VALUES(effect) upsert syntax is
deprecated since 8.0.20 (no MySQL server in CI to catch its removal).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two gaps the Task 11 re-review left open.
scopeKey guarded the empty-string tenantId but not its type, so null, 0,
false or an object flowed through un-normalised and the adapters diverged -
the db rejects on NOT NULL while memory accepts an unreachable row. The whole
premise of the empty-string guard was a caller who controls the tenant id,
and that caller can just as easily hand over a null from a JSON body.
The vacuous concurrency test was removed for good reason, but that left
nothing failing if someone re-wraps grant() in db.tx and reintroduces the
shared-connection rollback. A spy over driver.transaction discriminates that
deterministically, with no timing dependency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fix-round-1 test "a concurrent write is not lost to another
method's failure" was vacuous: a single-process Promise.all cannot
reliably land a bare write inside another method's open transaction,
so it passed against both the fixed and the (previously) defective
grant() implementation. The shared-connection rollback hazard it was
meant to catch is real (confirmed separately by forcing the
transaction open before the write), but this specific test could
never reach that state and gave false assurance either way.
Replaced it with "a rejected write leaves unrelated state intact",
which asserts a grant() call with an invalid effect is refused without
disturbing the subject's existing roles/grants, plus a NOTE
documenting that the rollback hazard is now prevented structurally (no
transactions) rather than by a dedicated concurrency test.
memoryPermissionStore.grant() had no effect validation, so it failed
the new test; added a guard mirroring the db adapter's CHECK
constraint so both adapters agree on rejecting anything other than
"allow"/"deny".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
I added "a concurrent write is not lost to another method's failure" to the
conformance suite to guard the fail-open the Task 11 review demonstrated. The
implementer reported they could not make it fail against the reverted code,
across 600 stress iterations. They were right.
I reproduced the underlying defect directly - forcing the transaction to open
before the bare write gives "revoke resolved without error: true" with the
role still present - so the mechanism is real. But the test cannot reach it:
Promise.all in one process does not reliably land the bare write inside the
open transaction, and grant() never fails on its own. The test passed against
the defective implementation, which is exactly the false assurance this suite
exists to prevent.
Replaced with a property that is actually guaranteed and adapter-agnostic: a
rejected write leaves unrelated state intact. The rollback hazard itself is
prevented structurally, by the store using no transactions, and that is now
stated in a comment rather than pretended to be under test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1/C2: grant() wrapped its delete+insert in db.tx on a shared,
unserialized sqlite connection, so a concurrent bare write from another
method (e.g. revokeRole) got swept into the open transaction and
discarded on rollback - a revoke could report success while the
privilege survived. Also broke concurrent grants on distinct keys
("cannot start a transaction within a transaction"). Replaced with
single-statement upserts (ON CONFLICT / ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE),
atomic without a transaction.
I1: assignRole's check-then-act SELECT lost 19/20 concurrent identical
calls to a UNIQUE violation; switched to ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
I2: an unrecognised `effect` value was dropped from both the grant and
deny buckets on read. Added a CHECK constraint and made anything not
literally "allow" count as a deny (fail closed).
I3: ensureAuthzTables defaulted to sqlite instead of the Db's own
dialect. I4: scopeKey now refuses an explicitly empty tenantId rather
than treating it as global (shared with the memory adapter). I5: added
migrations.test.ts asserting the generated DDL per dialect, including
MySQL's binary collation on identity columns. M1: DDL is now a
statement list instead of a blob split on a formatting-dependent
separator. M3: declared @wrnexus/db as a workspace dependency.
Extends the conformance suite with four concurrency/empty-scope tests
(23 total, up from 19) that all three adapters now pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The database store review found two Critical defects and several Important
ones, all reachable in production.
grant() was wrapped in db.tx for atomicity. The sqlite driver runs a bare
BEGIN on one shared connection with no serialization, so an open transaction
swallows any concurrent write from another method and discards it on
rollback. Demonstrated: revokeRole resolved with no error while the role
survived - a security-critical revoke reporting success with the privilege
retained. Concurrent grants also rejected outright with "cannot start a
transaction within a transaction". Replaced with single-statement upserts,
which are atomic without a transaction; assignRole likewise drops its
check-then-act SELECT for ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, which was rejecting 19 of
20 concurrent identical calls.
effect had no CHECK constraint and assignmentsFor classified by exact
equality, so a mis-cased or corrupted value was dropped from BOTH buckets -
a deny row that silently stopped denying. Added the constraint and made
anything that is not literally "allow" count as a deny.
scopeKey now refuses an explicitly empty tenantId rather than treating it as
global, which otherwise let a caller who controls the tenant id read and
write global assignments.
Also: ensureAuthzTables takes the dialect from db.driver.dialect instead of
defaulting to sqlite; the DDL is a list of statements rather than a blob
split on a formatting-dependent separator; MySQL identity columns get a
binary collation so tenant "T1" cannot match "t1"; and postgres placeholders
are numbered.
Adds four conformance tests for the concurrency and empty-scope cases. The
suite was entirely sequential and structurally could not catch any of this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds dbPermissionStore/ensureAuthzTables/authzMigrationSql, backed by
_wrn_authz_assignment and _wrn_authz_grant tables, plus a ./db subpath
export. Passes the identical 19-test store-conformance suite the memory
adapter passes, including tenant-scope isolation.
The repo had none, and core.autocrlf=true is the usual Git-on-Windows
setting, so a clone, checkout, or stash pop silently rewrites every text file
to CRLF. That fails format:check against prettier's endOfLine: lf - it
already turned the gate red once mid-branch, after a stash round-trip
reintroduced CRLF into files that had been committed clean.
Verified: no tracked file currently carries a CR byte at HEAD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 10 fix round 1: the coordinator's plan doc (41fb82b9) recorded that
generated authz type files should be skipped before the isSafeIslandName
check, but the code change never landed. isSafeIslandName rejects the dot
in the stripped basename "permissions.gen", so every app running Task 12's
codegen would warn on every boot.
Add a quiet skip for *.gen.ts / *.gen.js immediately after the extension
guard, before the name check. Add tests: a .gen.ts file is skipped without
a console.warn (spied), and a .gen.js file is skipped the same way while a
legitimately named .js declaration is still discovered.
Also corrects the scanDir extraExtensions doc comment, which incorrectly
implied app/schemas passes it too (only app/authz does).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The brief asserted permissions.gen.ts would be discovered as an entry named
permissions.gen and filtered by a later task. It is not: isSafeIslandName
rejects the dot in the stripped basename, so it takes the warn-and-skip path
and would print a warning on every boot of any app that ran the codegen,
while Task 14's name-based filter for it was dead code.
The scan now skips *.gen.ts / *.gen.js quietly, before the name check. Also
records the extraExtensions argument the implementer added to scanDir, which
keeps .js out of the route-scanning allow-list where it would otherwise leak
into generated route URLs via fileToRoute.
Caught by the Task 10 implementer testing the claim rather than trusting it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scan app/authz/<name>.{ts,js} the same way app/schemas is scanned,
exposing Router.authz: ComponentRef[]. Also update the two other
literal Router construction sites (prod runtime, dev-server test
fixture) that now need the new required field.
scanDir gains an optional extraExtensions parameter (default []) so
the authz scan can accept .js files without widening the extension
allow-list used by route scanning (app/pages, app/api, app/realtime),
which would otherwise leak .js into generated route URLs via
fileToRoute.
Move the "don't gate on permissionsFor() with permissionMatches" warning
onto permissionMatches itself so it's visible via autocomplete, not just
on AuthzResolver.permissionsFor. Round out exports.test.ts to cover
scopeKey, safeRecord, and AUTHZ_LOCALS_KEY, closing the gap where
dropping either export from index.ts would not fail the test.
permissionsFor carries a caveat that its Set cannot represent a narrow deny
under a broad grant, so callers must gate with decide(). Now that
permissionMatches is also public, the wrong composition is directly reachable
and looks idiomatic - and the warning lived only on the other half of it.
Adds the pointer to permissionMatches, and covers scopeKey and safeRecord in
the exports test, which the brief omitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Appends the Task 1-8 modules (defineAuthz, catalog merge helpers,
permission stores, audit sinks, resolver engine, and authzMiddleware/
can/guards) to the public @wrnexus/authz surface, and regenerates the
public-api-0.8.json baseline to match.
ClintchizandClaude Opus 5