Files
WRNexusJS/packages/security/src/url.ts
T
ClintchizandClaude Opus 5 c64434a131 fix(security): close SSRF, credential-leak, and auth bypass findings in 0.8.4
Audit of 0.8.4 found the repo's own gates green, so these came from manual
review; each is covered by a new regression test.

security/fetch.ts
- safeFetch re-attached Authorization/Cookie on a same-origin redirect that
  followed a cross-origin hop (a -> b -> b), handing credentials to the second
  host. Compare against the origin the caller trusted, not the previous hop.
- The private-network guard resolved the host, approved it, then let fetch
  resolve again, so a low-TTL record could answer public for the check and
  private for the connection. Pin the connection to the validated address,
  preserving Host and TLS serverName. Opt out with pinDns: false.
- 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:7f00:1 and fec0::1 were not treated as
  private. Add uncompressed IPv4-mapped forms, site-local IPv6, 198.18/15
  and 192.0.0/24.

security/url.ts
- sanitizeUrl returned "//evil.com" verbatim via the relative-path fast path,
  bypassing the host checks it had just run; in an href that navigates
  cross-origin. Resolve protocol-relative input instead.

dev-server/gateway.ts
- Malformed base64 in an Authorization header threw out of checkAuth on an
  unauthenticated path. Fail closed.
- split(":", 2) truncated passwords at the first colon, so a password
  containing ":" could never authenticate.
- The credential compare short-circuited on length mismatch, leaking length
  by timing. Extracted as verifyBasicAuth so it is testable.

authz/index.ts
- Namespace wildcards only matched the first segment, so "post:comment:*"
  did not grant "post:comment:delete". Match at every depth.

uploader/operations.ts
- Validate transcoder dimensions and bitrate rather than trusting the declared
  type, and reject ".." path segments.

package.json
- The brace-expansion override pinned 5.0.8, which is inside the advisory
  range >=4.0.0 <5.0.9. Bump to 5.0.9; bun audit is now clean.

Verified: check:production passes (typecheck, lint, 1033 tests, format,
ASVS, public-API baseline, editor checks).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 15:57:22 +05:30

115 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { SecurityError } from "./errors.ts";
export interface SafeUrlPolicy {
base?: string | URL;
allowRelative?: boolean;
allowedProtocols?: string[];
allowedHosts?: string[];
blockedHosts?: string[];
allowCredentials?: boolean;
allowDataImages?: boolean;
}
const DEFAULT_PROTOCOLS = ["http:", "https:"];
const RELATIVE_PREFIX = /^(?:\.{0,2}\/|\/|\?|#)/;
/**
* `//evil.com` (and the `/\evil.com` spelling browsers normalise to it) reads
* like a same-site path but navigates cross-origin. It must never be handed
* back verbatim, or the host checks above are bypassed entirely.
*/
function isProtocolRelative(raw: string): boolean {
return /^[/\\]{2}/.test(raw);
}
function hasAsciiControlOrSpace(value: string): boolean {
for (const character of value) {
const code = character.charCodeAt(0);
if (code <= 0x20 || code === 0x7f) return true;
}
return false;
}
function hostnameMatches(hostname: string, rule: string): boolean {
const normalized = rule.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
const host = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
if (normalized.startsWith("*.")) {
const suffix = normalized.slice(1);
return host.endsWith(suffix) && host.length > suffix.length;
}
return host === normalized;
}
export function validateUrl(value: string | URL, policy: SafeUrlPolicy = {}): URL {
const raw = String(value);
if (!raw || hasAsciiControlOrSpace(raw)) {
throw new SecurityError(
"WRN-SEC-URL-CONTROL",
"URL contains whitespace or control characters.",
);
}
const isRelative = RELATIVE_PREFIX.test(raw);
if (isRelative && policy.allowRelative === false) {
throw new SecurityError("WRN-SEC-URL-RELATIVE", "Relative URLs are not allowed.");
}
let url: URL;
try {
url = new URL(raw, policy.base ?? "http://wrnexus.invalid");
} catch (error) {
throw new SecurityError("WRN-SEC-URL-INVALID", "Invalid URL.", 400, { cause: error });
}
if (url.protocol === "data:") {
if (policy.allowDataImages && /^data:image\/(?:png|gif|jpeg|webp|avif);/i.test(raw)) return url;
throw new SecurityError("WRN-SEC-URL-DATA", "Data URLs are not allowed by this policy.");
}
const protocols = policy.allowedProtocols ?? DEFAULT_PROTOCOLS;
if (!protocols.includes(url.protocol)) {
throw new SecurityError(
"WRN-SEC-URL-PROTOCOL",
`URL protocol '${url.protocol}' is not allowed.`,
);
}
if (!policy.allowCredentials && (url.username || url.password)) {
throw new SecurityError("WRN-SEC-URL-CREDENTIALS", "Credentials in URLs are not allowed.");
}
if (policy.blockedHosts?.some((rule) => hostnameMatches(url.hostname, rule))) {
throw new SecurityError("WRN-SEC-URL-BLOCKED-HOST", `Host '${url.hostname}' is blocked.`);
}
if (
policy.allowedHosts?.length &&
!policy.allowedHosts.some((rule) => hostnameMatches(url.hostname, rule))
) {
throw new SecurityError("WRN-SEC-URL-HOST", `Host '${url.hostname}' is not allowlisted.`);
}
return url;
}
export function isSafeUrl(value: string | URL, policy: SafeUrlPolicy = {}): boolean {
try {
validateUrl(value, policy);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
export function sanitizeUrl(value: unknown, policy: SafeUrlPolicy = {}): string {
try {
const raw = String(value ?? "");
const url = validateUrl(raw, policy);
// Genuinely relative input round-trips unchanged; protocol-relative input
// is resolved so the returned string carries the host the policy approved.
if (RELATIVE_PREFIX.test(raw) && !isProtocolRelative(raw)) return raw;
return url.toString();
} catch {
return "about:blank";
}
}