Files
ClintchizandClaude Opus 5 c64434a131 fix(security): close SSRF, credential-leak, and auth bypass findings in 0.8.4
Audit of 0.8.4 found the repo's own gates green, so these came from manual
review; each is covered by a new regression test.

security/fetch.ts
- safeFetch re-attached Authorization/Cookie on a same-origin redirect that
  followed a cross-origin hop (a -> b -> b), handing credentials to the second
  host. Compare against the origin the caller trusted, not the previous hop.
- The private-network guard resolved the host, approved it, then let fetch
  resolve again, so a low-TTL record could answer public for the check and
  private for the connection. Pin the connection to the validated address,
  preserving Host and TLS serverName. Opt out with pinDns: false.
- 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:7f00:1 and fec0::1 were not treated as
  private. Add uncompressed IPv4-mapped forms, site-local IPv6, 198.18/15
  and 192.0.0/24.

security/url.ts
- sanitizeUrl returned "//evil.com" verbatim via the relative-path fast path,
  bypassing the host checks it had just run; in an href that navigates
  cross-origin. Resolve protocol-relative input instead.

dev-server/gateway.ts
- Malformed base64 in an Authorization header threw out of checkAuth on an
  unauthenticated path. Fail closed.
- split(":", 2) truncated passwords at the first colon, so a password
  containing ":" could never authenticate.
- The credential compare short-circuited on length mismatch, leaking length
  by timing. Extracted as verifyBasicAuth so it is testable.

authz/index.ts
- Namespace wildcards only matched the first segment, so "post:comment:*"
  did not grant "post:comment:delete". Match at every depth.

uploader/operations.ts
- Validate transcoder dimensions and bitrate rather than trusting the declared
  type, and reject ".." path segments.

package.json
- The brace-expansion override pinned 5.0.8, which is inside the advisory
  range >=4.0.0 <5.0.9. Bump to 5.0.9; bun audit is now clean.

Verified: check:production passes (typecheck, lint, 1033 tests, format,
ASVS, public-API baseline, editor checks).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 15:57:22 +05:30

41 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
import { defineRbac } from "../src/index.ts";
describe("RBAC namespace wildcards", () => {
const rbac = defineRbac({
admin: ["*"],
editor: ["post:*"],
moderator: ["post:comment:*"],
reader: ["post:read"],
});
test("a wildcard grants every depth beneath it", () => {
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["editor"] }, "post:write")).toBe(true);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["editor"] }, "post:comment:delete")).toBe(true);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["editor"] }, "post:comment:flag:undo")).toBe(true);
});
test("a deeper wildcard grants its own subtree", () => {
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["moderator"] }, "post:comment:delete")).toBe(true);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["moderator"] }, "post:comment:flag:undo")).toBe(true);
});
test("a wildcard does not leak sideways or upward", () => {
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["moderator"] }, "post:write")).toBe(false);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["moderator"] }, "post")).toBe(false);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["editor"] }, "page:write")).toBe(false);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["reader"] }, "post:write")).toBe(false);
});
test("root wildcard and unknown subjects behave", () => {
expect(rbac.can({ roles: ["admin"] }, "anything:at:all")).toBe(true);
expect(rbac.can({ roles: [] }, "post:read")).toBe(false);
expect(rbac.can(undefined, "post:read")).toBe(false);
});
test("role inheritance terminates on cycles", () => {
const cyclic = defineRbac({ a: ["role:b", "p:a"], b: ["role:a", "p:b"] });
expect([...cyclic.permissionsFor(["a"])].sort()).toEqual(["p:a", "p:b"]);
});
});