Emits sorted TS unions from the merged catalog so a typo in
can(ctx, "post:wrtie") is a compile-time error. Uses JSON.stringify
for string-literal escaping (not manual backslash/quote replace) so
role names containing raw newlines still produce valid TypeScript;
role names are not regex-validated like permission ids, so this
matters for the raw mergeCatalogs path.
N1: scopeKey guarded the empty-string VALUE but not the TYPE. A
non-string tenantId (null, 0, false, an object) flowed through
un-normalised, and the adapters disagreed about the result - db
rejects null on NOT NULL, memory accepts it as an unreachable row; 0
and false stringify differently and could collide. Now
`typeof tenantId !== "string" || tenantId === ""` is refused with the
same WRN-AUTHZ-SCOPE error. Added a conformance case covering
null/0/false/{}.
N2: nothing failed if grant() were re-wrapped in db.tx, reintroducing
the shared-connection rollback from C1/C2 - timing-based tests can't
reliably prove a transaction is never opened. Added
db-no-transaction.test.ts: a fake Db with a spied driver.transaction
and statement-recording all/exec, driving every PermissionStore method
and asserting zero transaction calls and no "BEGIN" in any recorded
statement. Verified it fails when grant() is temporarily re-wrapped in
db.tx, then restored.
Also documents two things in db.ts as comments only: the UNIQUE
constraints are now load-bearing for ON CONFLICT/ON DUPLICATE KEY
target inference, and MySQL's VALUES(effect) upsert syntax is
deprecated since 8.0.20 (no MySQL server in CI to catch its removal).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fix-round-1 test "a concurrent write is not lost to another
method's failure" was vacuous: a single-process Promise.all cannot
reliably land a bare write inside another method's open transaction,
so it passed against both the fixed and the (previously) defective
grant() implementation. The shared-connection rollback hazard it was
meant to catch is real (confirmed separately by forcing the
transaction open before the write), but this specific test could
never reach that state and gave false assurance either way.
Replaced it with "a rejected write leaves unrelated state intact",
which asserts a grant() call with an invalid effect is refused without
disturbing the subject's existing roles/grants, plus a NOTE
documenting that the rollback hazard is now prevented structurally (no
transactions) rather than by a dedicated concurrency test.
memoryPermissionStore.grant() had no effect validation, so it failed
the new test; added a guard mirroring the db adapter's CHECK
constraint so both adapters agree on rejecting anything other than
"allow"/"deny".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1/C2: grant() wrapped its delete+insert in db.tx on a shared,
unserialized sqlite connection, so a concurrent bare write from another
method (e.g. revokeRole) got swept into the open transaction and
discarded on rollback - a revoke could report success while the
privilege survived. Also broke concurrent grants on distinct keys
("cannot start a transaction within a transaction"). Replaced with
single-statement upserts (ON CONFLICT / ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE),
atomic without a transaction.
I1: assignRole's check-then-act SELECT lost 19/20 concurrent identical
calls to a UNIQUE violation; switched to ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
I2: an unrecognised `effect` value was dropped from both the grant and
deny buckets on read. Added a CHECK constraint and made anything not
literally "allow" count as a deny (fail closed).
I3: ensureAuthzTables defaulted to sqlite instead of the Db's own
dialect. I4: scopeKey now refuses an explicitly empty tenantId rather
than treating it as global (shared with the memory adapter). I5: added
migrations.test.ts asserting the generated DDL per dialect, including
MySQL's binary collation on identity columns. M1: DDL is now a
statement list instead of a blob split on a formatting-dependent
separator. M3: declared @wrnexus/db as a workspace dependency.
Extends the conformance suite with four concurrency/empty-scope tests
(23 total, up from 19) that all three adapters now pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds dbPermissionStore/ensureAuthzTables/authzMigrationSql, backed by
_wrn_authz_assignment and _wrn_authz_grant tables, plus a ./db subpath
export. Passes the identical 19-test store-conformance suite the memory
adapter passes, including tenant-scope isolation.
Move the "don't gate on permissionsFor() with permissionMatches" warning
onto permissionMatches itself so it's visible via autocomplete, not just
on AuthzResolver.permissionsFor. Round out exports.test.ts to cover
scopeKey, safeRecord, and AUTHZ_LOCALS_KEY, closing the gap where
dropping either export from index.ts would not fail the test.
Appends the Task 1-8 modules (defineAuthz, catalog merge helpers,
permission stores, audit sinks, resolver engine, and authzMiddleware/
can/guards) to the public @wrnexus/authz surface, and regenerates the
public-api-0.8.json baseline to match.
Fix round 3 for Task 7 (N5, minor-to-important): fix round 2's
encodeURI(options.redirectTo) fixed the non-ASCII crash but broke the
most common real use of redirectTo -- a return-path query param that's
already percent-encoded (e.g. /login?next=%2Fdash) -- because encodeURI
also escapes "%", double-encoding it to %252Fdash. Replaced with
headerSafePath(), a codepoint loop that encodes only codepoints above
0x7f (matching isLocalPath's style: no regex, no source escapes) and
leaves "%" alone.
Added tests: an already-percent-encoded target round-trips unchanged;
a non-ASCII target still 303s without throwing and the location is
ASCII-only; a plain ASCII target passes through byte-identical.
Fix round 2 for Task 7 (plan amendment 9e3624e5):
- N1 (Important): the memo key carried scope and permission but not the
subject, so a request that reassigns ctx.user mid-flight (impersonation,
step-up auth, session revocation, or an authz-before-auth middleware
ordering mistake) could be served the previous principal's cached
verdict. subjectId (typeof + String, matching the existing scope/value
encoding style) is now folded into every memo key.
- N2 (Minor): the primitive-value memo key used String(resource), which
collapses distinct Symbol("row") values into one slot and maps -0 onto
0's slot. Added a dedicated bySymbol identity memo (WeakMap-style, but a
plain Map since symbols aren't valid WeakMap keys pre-registry symbols
and the memo is request-scoped anyway) and special-cased Object.is(x,-0)
to render as "-0".
- N3 (Minor): the rejected-redirect console.error interpolated
redirectTo directly, exactly the value most likely to carry CR/LF in
that branch. Switched to JSON.stringify(redirectTo) for the log line.
- N4 (Minor): a non-ASCII (but otherwise valid, local) redirectTo passed
isLocalPath and then threw inside `new Response` building the Location
header. Wrapped it in encodeURI().
Added 5 regression tests: subject swap re-evaluates, clearing ctx.user
denies, two same-description symbols get separate verdicts, 0 vs -0 get
separate verdicts, non-ASCII redirectTo 303s with an encoded location
instead of throwing. N1 revert-checked: temporarily restored the
two-element (no-subject) key and confirmed both subject-swap tests fail
against it before restoring the fix.
Fix round 1 for Task 7, addressing review findings against the brief's
own memoKey design (now superseded per plan amendment cc8085bc):
- C1: memoKey's String(id) + JSON.stringify-with-catch cross-authorized
distinct resources whenever their ids stringified the same (numeric
vs string ids, object-shaped ids) or whenever JSON.stringify threw
(circular references, BigInt fields, throwing getters all shared one
"<unserialisable>" bucket, so the first verdict computed for any of
them became the cached verdict for all of them in that request).
- C2: filterCan inherited the same bypass, returning rows the subject
could not act on.
- Replaced serialisation-based memoization with identity-based
memoization: object resources are memoised in a WeakMap keyed by the
resource reference itself (never serialised), primitives/absent
resources in a Map keyed by [scope, permission, typeof, String(value)]
so 7 and "7" can never collide.
- I1: scope is now read from ctx.tenant at decision time (currentScope),
not captured once at middleware-install time, so a tenant switch
mid-request is honoured on the next check.
- I2/M1: guardPermission's redirectTo now only fires for non-JSON/API
requests (replicated wantsJson check, since authz may only import
core as types) and only for a validated local path (isLocalPath),
closing an open-redirect and a JSON-caller-follows-303 gap.
- I3: getResource is now wrapped in try/catch; a throw denies with the
standard opaque 403 body instead of propagating the loader's error
(e.g. a SQL string) to the client.
- Added cache-control: private, no-store to both the 303 and 403
responses.
Added 11 regression tests. C1/C2 revert-checked: temporarily restored
the old memoKey design and confirmed the four collision tests fail
against it before restoring the fix.
Installs a per-request authz resolver via authzMiddleware and exposes
can()/decideFor()/guardPermission()/filterCan() as free functions (not
Context members, so @wrnexus/core stays free of an authz dependency).
All four route through resolver.decide(), never permissionsFor(), so
resource-scoped policy denials can't be bypassed via the coarse
permission set. Per-request results are memoised keyed on (permission,
resource) to avoid re-hitting the store within a request without
leaking one resource's verdict onto another.
Re-review of Task 6's fix round 1 (plan amendment d6a2d054) found three
items in that diff plus one adjacent pre-existing issue that C1 made
reachable:
- Important (perf): permissionsFor() rebuilt the deny Set on every
entry in the granted set (O(grants x denies) allocations on a
per-request path). Hoisted to build the Set once. Measured
4000x4000: 665.92ms before, 3.90ms after.
- Important (contract accuracy): permissionsFor() only half-agrees
with decide() — a narrow deny under a broad grant (e.g. role editor's
"post:*" plus a deny on "post:delete") can't be represented in a flat
Set, so the set still contains "post:*" while decide() correctly
refuses "post:delete". Documented as NOT authoritative on the
AuthzResolver interface, and pinned with a regression test asserting
the divergence is deliberate.
- Minor: subject.id === "" was audited as subjectId: "" instead of
omitted, so consoleAuditSink printed a blank subject= rather than
subject=anonymous. Reused the same non-empty-string guard as the
decide() path.
- Important (adjacent, advanced.ts): owner() compared subject[key] to
resource[key] with Object.is without checking either side was
present, so two absent ids (Object.is(undefined, undefined) ===
true) satisfied ownership. Unreachable before this task, but C1 now
runs bound policies for anonymous/empty subjects, putting this on a
live path. Fixed to deny whenever either side is undefined or null.
Every fix's regression test was verified by reverting the fix and
confirming the test fails against the pre-fix code before restoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Coordinator review of Task 6's resolution engine (plan amendment
86b3dc1e) found two critical and four important defects, all inherited
from the brief's original engine snippet:
- C1: anonymous callers on a public permission returned allow before
running bound policies, so the least-trusted caller got the weakest
evaluation. Policies now run for anonymous subjects too.
- C2: the policy verdict check was a truthiness test (`!verdict.allowed`),
so a policy returning `{allowed: "yes"}` granted access. Now requires
`verdict?.allowed === true` exactly, and no longer spreads the raw
verdict into the decision (which leaked arbitrary policy fields).
- I1: a binding naming a policy the catalog doesn't have was silently
`continue`d, granting whatever the policy was meant to guard. Now
denies with "Policy unavailable".
- I3: denies were checked by exact string equality, so a wildcard deny
(e.g. "post:*") was accepted and silently did nothing. Denies now go
through the same depth-aware wildcard matching as grants, via the new
exported `deniedBy()`.
- I2: `permissionsFor` now subtracts denied entries so it agrees with
`decide()` — needed for Task 7's UI gating to compose correctly.
- I4: non-string/empty `subject.id` (0, "", 123, {}) no longer silently
falls back to anonymous; it denies with "Invalid subject". `subject:
null` (no subject at all) remains genuinely anonymous.
Added six regression tests, each verified by reverting its fix and
confirming the test fails against the old code before restoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
U+0085 (NEL), U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR), and U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR)
are treated as line terminators by some log shippers and by JS's own
lexical grammar (and are not escaped by JSON.stringify by default), so
they could still be used to forge audit log entries even after the
initial C0/DEL fix. logSafe now strips all five categories.
Prevents audit log injection: subjectId, tenantId, and reason trace back
to request input, so an unsanitized newline could forge a second,
fully-formed audit line indistinguishable from a real entry. Adds
logSafe() to strip control characters before interpolation and logs the
previously-missing policy field.
The scope-prefix concatenation cacheKey used a bare U+FFFD separator with
no escaping, so an adversarial subject/tenant id containing that character
could collide with a different subject/tenant pair and leak cached roles
across tenants. Switch to JSON.stringify([scopeKey, subjectId]) for an
unambiguous key.
Also replace the untested key.endsWith() substring sweep used to
invalidate a subject across all tenants on a global write with an
explicit bySubject index, and add test coverage for both the collision
and the cross-tenant invalidation sweep.
Audit of 0.8.4 found the repo's own gates green, so these came from manual
review; each is covered by a new regression test.
security/fetch.ts
- safeFetch re-attached Authorization/Cookie on a same-origin redirect that
followed a cross-origin hop (a -> b -> b), handing credentials to the second
host. Compare against the origin the caller trusted, not the previous hop.
- The private-network guard resolved the host, approved it, then let fetch
resolve again, so a low-TTL record could answer public for the check and
private for the connection. Pin the connection to the validated address,
preserving Host and TLS serverName. Opt out with pinDns: false.
- 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:7f00:1 and fec0::1 were not treated as
private. Add uncompressed IPv4-mapped forms, site-local IPv6, 198.18/15
and 192.0.0/24.
security/url.ts
- sanitizeUrl returned "//evil.com" verbatim via the relative-path fast path,
bypassing the host checks it had just run; in an href that navigates
cross-origin. Resolve protocol-relative input instead.
dev-server/gateway.ts
- Malformed base64 in an Authorization header threw out of checkAuth on an
unauthenticated path. Fail closed.
- split(":", 2) truncated passwords at the first colon, so a password
containing ":" could never authenticate.
- The credential compare short-circuited on length mismatch, leaking length
by timing. Extracted as verifyBasicAuth so it is testable.
authz/index.ts
- Namespace wildcards only matched the first segment, so "post:comment:*"
did not grant "post:comment:delete". Match at every depth.
uploader/operations.ts
- Validate transcoder dimensions and bitrate rather than trusting the declared
type, and reject ".." path segments.
package.json
- The brace-expansion override pinned 5.0.8, which is inside the advisory
range >=4.0.0 <5.0.9. Bump to 5.0.9; bun audit is now clean.
Verified: check:production passes (typecheck, lint, 1033 tests, format,
ASVS, public-API baseline, editor checks).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clintchiz
