Fix round 1 for Task 7, addressing review findings against the brief's
own memoKey design (now superseded per plan amendment cc8085bc):
- C1: memoKey's String(id) + JSON.stringify-with-catch cross-authorized
distinct resources whenever their ids stringified the same (numeric
vs string ids, object-shaped ids) or whenever JSON.stringify threw
(circular references, BigInt fields, throwing getters all shared one
"<unserialisable>" bucket, so the first verdict computed for any of
them became the cached verdict for all of them in that request).
- C2: filterCan inherited the same bypass, returning rows the subject
could not act on.
- Replaced serialisation-based memoization with identity-based
memoization: object resources are memoised in a WeakMap keyed by the
resource reference itself (never serialised), primitives/absent
resources in a Map keyed by [scope, permission, typeof, String(value)]
so 7 and "7" can never collide.
- I1: scope is now read from ctx.tenant at decision time (currentScope),
not captured once at middleware-install time, so a tenant switch
mid-request is honoured on the next check.
- I2/M1: guardPermission's redirectTo now only fires for non-JSON/API
requests (replicated wantsJson check, since authz may only import
core as types) and only for a validated local path (isLocalPath),
closing an open-redirect and a JSON-caller-follows-303 gap.
- I3: getResource is now wrapped in try/catch; a throw denies with the
standard opaque 403 body instead of propagating the loader's error
(e.g. a SQL string) to the client.
- Added cache-control: private, no-store to both the 303 and 403
responses.
Added 11 regression tests. C1/C2 revert-checked: temporarily restored
the old memoKey design and confirmed the four collision tests fail
against it before restoring the fix.
Installs a per-request authz resolver via authzMiddleware and exposes
can()/decideFor()/guardPermission()/filterCan() as free functions (not
Context members, so @wrnexus/core stays free of an authz dependency).
All four route through resolver.decide(), never permissionsFor(), so
resource-scoped policy denials can't be bypassed via the coarse
permission set. Per-request results are memoised keyed on (permission,
resource) to avoid re-hitting the store within a request without
leaking one resource's verdict onto another.
Re-review of Task 6's fix round 1 (plan amendment d6a2d054) found three
items in that diff plus one adjacent pre-existing issue that C1 made
reachable:
- Important (perf): permissionsFor() rebuilt the deny Set on every
entry in the granted set (O(grants x denies) allocations on a
per-request path). Hoisted to build the Set once. Measured
4000x4000: 665.92ms before, 3.90ms after.
- Important (contract accuracy): permissionsFor() only half-agrees
with decide() — a narrow deny under a broad grant (e.g. role editor's
"post:*" plus a deny on "post:delete") can't be represented in a flat
Set, so the set still contains "post:*" while decide() correctly
refuses "post:delete". Documented as NOT authoritative on the
AuthzResolver interface, and pinned with a regression test asserting
the divergence is deliberate.
- Minor: subject.id === "" was audited as subjectId: "" instead of
omitted, so consoleAuditSink printed a blank subject= rather than
subject=anonymous. Reused the same non-empty-string guard as the
decide() path.
- Important (adjacent, advanced.ts): owner() compared subject[key] to
resource[key] with Object.is without checking either side was
present, so two absent ids (Object.is(undefined, undefined) ===
true) satisfied ownership. Unreachable before this task, but C1 now
runs bound policies for anonymous/empty subjects, putting this on a
live path. Fixed to deny whenever either side is undefined or null.
Every fix's regression test was verified by reverting the fix and
confirming the test fails against the pre-fix code before restoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Coordinator review of Task 6's resolution engine (plan amendment
86b3dc1e) found two critical and four important defects, all inherited
from the brief's original engine snippet:
- C1: anonymous callers on a public permission returned allow before
running bound policies, so the least-trusted caller got the weakest
evaluation. Policies now run for anonymous subjects too.
- C2: the policy verdict check was a truthiness test (`!verdict.allowed`),
so a policy returning `{allowed: "yes"}` granted access. Now requires
`verdict?.allowed === true` exactly, and no longer spreads the raw
verdict into the decision (which leaked arbitrary policy fields).
- I1: a binding naming a policy the catalog doesn't have was silently
`continue`d, granting whatever the policy was meant to guard. Now
denies with "Policy unavailable".
- I3: denies were checked by exact string equality, so a wildcard deny
(e.g. "post:*") was accepted and silently did nothing. Denies now go
through the same depth-aware wildcard matching as grants, via the new
exported `deniedBy()`.
- I2: `permissionsFor` now subtracts denied entries so it agrees with
`decide()` — needed for Task 7's UI gating to compose correctly.
- I4: non-string/empty `subject.id` (0, "", 123, {}) no longer silently
falls back to anonymous; it denies with "Invalid subject". `subject:
null` (no subject at all) remains genuinely anonymous.
Added six regression tests, each verified by reverting its fix and
confirming the test fails against the old code before restoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
U+0085 (NEL), U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR), and U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR)
are treated as line terminators by some log shippers and by JS's own
lexical grammar (and are not escaped by JSON.stringify by default), so
they could still be used to forge audit log entries even after the
initial C0/DEL fix. logSafe now strips all five categories.
Prevents audit log injection: subjectId, tenantId, and reason trace back
to request input, so an unsanitized newline could forge a second,
fully-formed audit line indistinguishable from a real entry. Adds
logSafe() to strip control characters before interpolation and logs the
previously-missing policy field.
The scope-prefix concatenation cacheKey used a bare U+FFFD separator with
no escaping, so an adversarial subject/tenant id containing that character
could collide with a different subject/tenant pair and leak cached roles
across tenants. Switch to JSON.stringify([scopeKey, subjectId]) for an
unambiguous key.
Also replace the untested key.endsWith() substring sweep used to
invalidate a subject across all tenants on a global write with an
explicit bySubject index, and add test coverage for both the collision
and the cross-tenant invalidation sweep.
Audit of 0.8.4 found the repo's own gates green, so these came from manual
review; each is covered by a new regression test.
security/fetch.ts
- safeFetch re-attached Authorization/Cookie on a same-origin redirect that
followed a cross-origin hop (a -> b -> b), handing credentials to the second
host. Compare against the origin the caller trusted, not the previous hop.
- The private-network guard resolved the host, approved it, then let fetch
resolve again, so a low-TTL record could answer public for the check and
private for the connection. Pin the connection to the validated address,
preserving Host and TLS serverName. Opt out with pinDns: false.
- 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1, ::ffff:7f00:1 and fec0::1 were not treated as
private. Add uncompressed IPv4-mapped forms, site-local IPv6, 198.18/15
and 192.0.0/24.
security/url.ts
- sanitizeUrl returned "//evil.com" verbatim via the relative-path fast path,
bypassing the host checks it had just run; in an href that navigates
cross-origin. Resolve protocol-relative input instead.
dev-server/gateway.ts
- Malformed base64 in an Authorization header threw out of checkAuth on an
unauthenticated path. Fail closed.
- split(":", 2) truncated passwords at the first colon, so a password
containing ":" could never authenticate.
- The credential compare short-circuited on length mismatch, leaking length
by timing. Extracted as verifyBasicAuth so it is testable.
authz/index.ts
- Namespace wildcards only matched the first segment, so "post:comment:*"
did not grant "post:comment:delete". Match at every depth.
uploader/operations.ts
- Validate transcoder dimensions and bitrate rather than trusting the declared
type, and reject ".." path segments.
package.json
- The brace-expansion override pinned 5.0.8, which is inside the advisory
range >=4.0.0 <5.0.9. Bump to 5.0.9; bun audit is now clean.
Verified: check:production passes (typecheck, lint, 1033 tests, format,
ASVS, public-API baseline, editor checks).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clintchiz
