test(authz): end-to-end integration coverage, worked example, and docs

Task 15 of the authz permissions plan: proves db store + cache + catalog + middleware + audit compose correctly, wires a real (non-dangling) example into auth-showcase, and documents the declaration/registration/precedence surface in the package README.
2026-08-05 01:22:13 +05:30
parent 57097c8204
commit fd5e2b7128
6 changed files with 348 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -149,3 +149,133 @@ app.put(
 - **Bun-only** — like the rest of WrNexus, this package targets the Bun runtime; Node is not supported.
 - Works with [`@wrnexus/core`](../core) — the guards return `Middleware` and read the subject from `ctx.user` on the request `Context`. Both types are imported from `@wrnexus/core`.
 - Policy combinators (`any`, `all`) and `authorize` are async-aware, so policies may return a `Promise<boolean>` (e.g. for a database ownership check).
+
+## Declaring permissions
+
+The RBAC/PBAC/ABAC surface above is the low-level toolkit. On top of it sits a
+declarative **registry + catalog + store + engine**: permissions, roles, and
+policies are declared once in code, merged into a frozen catalog at boot, and
+resolved per-request against a pluggable `PermissionStore` that holds who has
+what.
+
+Put declarations in `app/authz/<name>.ts`; they are discovered automatically
+and merged (conflicting declarations of the same permission/role/policy across
+files fail the boot loudly, naming both source files).
+
+```ts
+import { defineAuthz, owner } from "@wrnexus/authz";
+
+export default defineAuthz({
+  permissions: {
+    "post:read": { title: "View posts", public: true },
+    "post:delete": { title: "Delete posts", risk: "high" },
+  },
+  // "post:*" is a namespace wildcard grant, valid inside a role's list — it is
+  // not itself a registered permission, so it can only ever grant permissions
+  // that ARE declared above (e.g. "post:read", "post:delete").
+  roles: { editor: ["post:*"], admin: ["role:editor"] },
+  policies: { ownsPost: owner("id", "authorId") },
+  bindings: { "post:delete": ["ownsPost"] },
+});
+```
+
+`public: true` means anonymous callers may hold the permission — but any
+policy bound to it still runs, and can still veto the anonymous caller (e.g. a
+`notBanned` policy on a public `post:preview` permission).
+
+## Checking permissions
+
+Register `authzMiddleware` once, in `app/middleware/`, with the merged
+catalog and a `PermissionStore`. Like every other `app/middleware/*.ts` file,
+the registration is an eager, module-scope call — the same shape as
+`authzMiddleware({ catalog, store })` requires — so it must run after the
+catalog has been populated. Both the dev server and `wrnexus build`'s
+generated production entry guarantee `getAuthzCatalog()` is populated before
+any app middleware module evaluates. Name the file so it sorts after whatever
+middleware sets `ctx.user` (middleware runs in alphabetical filename order —
+`authz.ts` after `auth.ts`, for instance).
+
+```ts
+// app/middleware/authz.ts
+import { authzMiddleware, getAuthzCatalog } from "@wrnexus/authz";
+import { dbPermissionStore } from "@wrnexus/authz/db";
+import { getDb } from "@wrnexus/db";
+
+export default authzMiddleware({ catalog: getAuthzCatalog(), store: dbPermissionStore(getDb()) });
+```
+
+There is no per-route `middleware` export — `app/middleware/*.ts` is the only
+place middleware is registered. To gate part of the app, branch on the
+request the same way any other conditional middleware does (compare
+`app/middleware/captcha-login.ts` in the auth showcase, which branches on
+method + path the same way):
+
+```ts
+// app/middleware/protect-posts.ts
+import type { Context, Next } from "@wrnexus/core";
+import { guardPermission } from "@wrnexus/authz";
+
+const guardPostWrite = guardPermission("post:write");
+
+export default function protectPosts(ctx: Context, next: Next) {
+  return ctx.url.pathname.startsWith("/api/posts") && ctx.req.method !== "GET"
+    ? guardPostWrite(ctx, next)
+    : next();
+}
+```
+
+Or check inline inside a route handler with the free function `can()`:
+
+```ts
+// app/api/posts/[id].ts
+import type { Context } from "@wrnexus/core";
+import { can } from "@wrnexus/authz";
+
+export const DELETE = async (ctx: Context) => {
+  const post = { id: "1", authorId: "alice" }; // load your own resource here
+  if (!(await can(ctx, "post:delete", post))) {
+    return Response.json({ ok: false, error: "Forbidden" }, { status: 403 });
+  }
+  return Response.json({ ok: true });
+};
+```
+
+`can()` is a free function taking `ctx`, not `ctx.can` — `@wrnexus/core` must
+not depend on `@wrnexus/authz`, so the per-request resolver lives in
+`ctx.locals` instead, reached through `can()` / `decideFor()` /
+`guardPermission()` / `filterCan()`. Calling any of them before
+`authzMiddleware` has run for that request throws a `WRN-AUTHZ-SETUP` error
+naming the missing registration, rather than silently denying.
+
+See `examples/auth-showcase/app/authz/showcase.ts` and
+`examples/auth-showcase/app/middleware/authz.ts` for a complete, runnable
+version of this wiring.
+
+## Precedence
+
+1. An explicit deny wins over everything, including `*` — and honours the
+   same namespace-wildcard matching as grants (denying `post:*` blocks
+   `post:comment:delete`, not just `post:*` itself).
+2. A bound policy can veto a permission a role grants, and runs even for a
+   `public: true` permission — including for an anonymous caller.
+3. Otherwise the permission must be held via a role or an explicit grant.
+4. Default deny.
+
+Every failure — an unknown permission (outside strict/dev mode), a store
+outage, a thrown policy — denies rather than throwing through to the caller.
+
+`permissionsFor()` (on the resolver returned by `createAuthzResolver`) is a
+coarse hint for hiding UI (e.g. a menu section), **never authoritative**. A
+`Set<string>` cannot represent "granted `post:*` except `post:delete`", so a
+narrow deny beneath a broad grant is invisible to it — the set still contains
+`post:*` while `can()` / `decide()` correctly refuse `post:delete`. Gate real
+actions with `can()`, `decideFor()`, or `filterCan()`; never by matching
+against `permissionsFor()`'s result.
+
+## CLI
+
+```bash
+wrnexus authz list      # every registered permission, role, and policy
+wrnexus authz generate  # app/authz/permissions.gen.ts type unions
+wrnexus authz init      # scaffold the assignment-table migration
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import type { Context } from "@wrnexus/core";
+import { createDb } from "@wrnexus/db";
+import { sqlite } from "@wrnexus/db/sqlite";
+import { dbPermissionStore, ensureAuthzTables } from "../src/db.ts";
+import {
+  authzMiddleware,
+  can,
+  cachedPermissionStore,
+  defineAuthz,
+  guardPermission,
+  memoryAuditSink,
+  mergeCatalogs,
+} from "../src/index.ts";
+
+// Exercises the full composition end to end: db-backed store -> cache
+// decorator -> merged catalog -> per-request middleware -> can()/guardPermission()
+// -> audit sink. Each piece already has unit coverage elsewhere; this file is
+// only about the seams between them.
+const catalog = mergeCatalogs([
+  {
+    source: "showcase.ts",
+    module: defineAuthz({
+      permissions: {
+        "post:read": { public: true },
+        "post:write": {},
+        "post:delete": { risk: "high" },
+      },
+      roles: { editor: ["post:write"], admin: ["role:editor", "post:delete"] },
+      policies: {
+        ownsPost: async (s: { id?: string }, r?: { authorId?: string }) =>
+          r?.authorId === s?.id ? { allowed: true } : { allowed: false, reason: "not owner" },
+      },
+      bindings: { "post:delete": ["ownsPost"] },
+    }),
+  },
+]);
+
+function makeCtx(user: unknown, tenantId?: string): Context {
+  return {
+    user,
+    tenant: tenantId ? { id: tenantId } : undefined,
+    locals: {},
+    url: new URL("http://localhost/"),
+    req: new Request("http://localhost/"),
+  } as unknown as Context;
+}
+
+describe("end-to-end authorization", () => {
+  test("db store, cache, catalog, middleware, and audit compose", async () => {
+    const db = createDb(sqlite(":memory:"));
+    await ensureAuthzTables(db, "sqlite");
+    const store = cachedPermissionStore(dbPermissionStore(db), { ttlMs: 1_000 });
+    const audit = memoryAuditSink();
+    await store.assignRole("alice", "admin", { tenantId: "acme" });
+
+    const alice = makeCtx({ id: "alice" }, "acme");
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog, store, audit, strict: true })(
+      alice,
+      async () => new Response("ok"),
+    );
+
+    expect(await can(alice, "post:write")).toBe(true);
+    expect(await can(alice, "post:delete", { id: 1, authorId: "alice" })).toBe(true);
+    expect(await can(alice, "post:delete", { id: 2, authorId: "bob" })).toBe(false);
+
+    // Wrong tenant: the admin role was scoped to acme.
+    const elsewhere = makeCtx({ id: "alice" }, "other");
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog, store, strict: true })(
+      elsewhere,
+      async () => new Response("ok"),
+    );
+    expect(await can(elsewhere, "post:write")).toBe(false);
+
+    // Anonymous can still read, because post:read is public.
+    const guest = makeCtx(null);
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog, store, strict: true })(guest, async () => new Response("ok"));
+    expect(await can(guest, "post:read")).toBe(true);
+    expect(await can(guest, "post:write")).toBe(false);
+
+    // Only denials were audited, and only alice's requests used the resolver
+    // that was wired to this audit sink.
+    expect(audit.events.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(audit.events.every((event) => !event.allowed)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("revoking a role takes effect immediately through the cache", async () => {
+    const db = createDb(sqlite(":memory:"));
+    await ensureAuthzTables(db, "sqlite");
+    const store = cachedPermissionStore(dbPermissionStore(db), { ttlMs: 60_000 });
+    await store.assignRole("bob", "editor");
+
+    const before = makeCtx({ id: "bob" });
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog, store, strict: true })(before, async () => new Response("ok"));
+    expect(await can(before, "post:write")).toBe(true);
+
+    await store.revokeRole("bob", "editor");
+
+    const after = makeCtx({ id: "bob" });
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog, store, strict: true })(after, async () => new Response("ok"));
+    expect(await can(after, "post:write")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("guardPermission returns an opaque 403", async () => {
+    const db = createDb(sqlite(":memory:"));
+    await ensureAuthzTables(db, "sqlite");
+    const ctx = makeCtx({ id: "carol" });
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog, store: dbPermissionStore(db), strict: true })(
+      ctx,
+      async () => new Response("ok"),
+    );
+    const res = await guardPermission("post:write")(ctx, async () => new Response("passed"));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(await res.json()).toEqual({ ok: false, error: "Forbidden" });
+  });
+
+  test("a public permission still runs its bound policy, including for an anonymous caller", async () => {
+    const publicPolicyCatalog = mergeCatalogs([
+      {
+        source: "public-policy.ts",
+        module: defineAuthz({
+          permissions: { "post:preview": { public: true } },
+          policies: {
+            notBanned: async (_s: { id?: string } | null | undefined, r?: { banned?: boolean }) =>
+              r?.banned ? { allowed: false, reason: "resource banned" } : { allowed: true },
+          },
+          bindings: { "post:preview": ["notBanned"] },
+        }),
+      },
+    ]);
+    const db = createDb(sqlite(":memory:"));
+    await ensureAuthzTables(db, "sqlite");
+    const store = dbPermissionStore(db);
+
+    const guest = makeCtx(null);
+    await authzMiddleware({ catalog: publicPolicyCatalog, store, strict: true })(
+      guest,
+      async () => new Response("ok"),
+    );
+    expect(await can(guest, "post:preview", { banned: false })).toBe(true);
+    expect(await can(guest, "post:preview", { banned: true })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});