fix(authz): guard scopeKey's tenantId type, add deterministic C1/C2 guard

N1: scopeKey guarded the empty-string VALUE but not the TYPE. A
non-string tenantId (null, 0, false, an object) flowed through
un-normalised, and the adapters disagreed about the result - db
rejects null on NOT NULL, memory accepts it as an unreachable row; 0
and false stringify differently and could collide. Now
`typeof tenantId !== "string" || tenantId === ""` is refused with the
same WRN-AUTHZ-SCOPE error. Added a conformance case covering
null/0/false/{}.

N2: nothing failed if grant() were re-wrapped in db.tx, reintroducing
the shared-connection rollback from C1/C2 - timing-based tests can't
reliably prove a transaction is never opened. Added
db-no-transaction.test.ts: a fake Db with a spied driver.transaction
and statement-recording all/exec, driving every PermissionStore method
and asserting zero transaction calls and no "BEGIN" in any recorded
statement. Verified it fails when grant() is temporarily re-wrapped in
db.tx, then restored.

Also documents two things in db.ts as comments only: the UNIQUE
constraints are now load-bearing for ON CONFLICT/ON DUPLICATE KEY
target inference, and MySQL's VALUES(effect) upsert syntax is
deprecated since 8.0.20 (no MySQL server in CI to catch its removal).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

packages/authz/src/db.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,16 @@ import type { AuthzScope, SubjectAssignments } from "./types.ts";
 // database-related, including the DDL the CLI scaffolds.
 export { authzMigrationSql } from "./migrations.ts";
 
-/** Create the tables if absent. Production apps should use a real migration. */
+/**
+ * Create the tables if absent. Production apps should use a real migration.
+ *
+ * The UNIQUE constraints in this DDL are load-bearing beyond deduplication:
+ * `grant`/`assignRole` below use ON CONFLICT / ON DUPLICATE KEY, which infers
+ * its conflict target from them. A hand-rolled migration that recreates these
+ * tables without `_wrn_authz_grant_unique` (or the assignment equivalent)
+ * will make those methods reject outright, where the old delete-then-insert
+ * approach would have silently worked without the constraint.
+ */
 export async function ensureAuthzTables(
   db: Db,
   dialect: Dialect = db.driver.dialect,
@@ -73,6 +82,10 @@ export function dbPermissionStore(db: Db): PermissionStore {
     },
 
     async grant(subjectId, permission, effect, scope) {
+      // `VALUES(effect)` is deprecated as of MySQL 8.0.20 in favour of the
+      // row-alias form (`... VALUES (...) AS new ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE
+      // effect = new.effect`). Noted here rather than migrated because there
+      // is no MySQL server in CI to catch its eventual removal.
       await db.exec(
         `INSERT INTO _wrn_authz_grant (subject_id, scope, permission, effect) VALUES (${p(1)}, ${p(2)}, ${p(3)}, ${p(4)})` +
           onConflict(

packages/authz/src/store.ts

@@ -18,16 +18,23 @@ export interface PermissionStore {
 
 /**
  * Global assignments are stored under the empty-string scope key. An OMITTED
- * scope means global; an explicitly EMPTY tenantId is refused, because it is
+ * scope means global; an explicitly EMPTY or non-string tenantId is refused,
- * indistinguishable from global and would let a caller who controls the tenant
+ * because an empty string is indistinguishable from global (and would let a
- * id read and write global assignments.
+ * caller who controls the tenant id read and write global assignments), and a
+ * non-string value (e.g. `null` from a JSON body or a nullable column) would
+ * otherwise flow through un-normalised and leave the adapters disagreeing
+ * about what happened.
  */
 export function scopeKey(scope?: AuthzScope): string {
   const tenantId = scope?.tenantId;
   if (tenantId === undefined) return "";
-  if (tenantId === "") {
+  // Guard the TYPE as well as the value: a null from a JSON body or a nullable
+  // column would otherwise flow through un-normalised and the adapters would
+  // disagree about what happened - the db rejects on NOT NULL, memory accepts
+  // an unreachable row.
+  if (typeof tenantId !== "string" || tenantId === "") {
     throw new Error(
-      "WRN-AUTHZ-SCOPE: tenantId must not be empty; omit the scope for a global assignment.",
+      "WRN-AUTHZ-SCOPE: tenantId must be a non-empty string; omit the scope for a global assignment.",
     );
   }
   return tenantId;

packages/authz/test/db-no-transaction.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import type { Db, Dialect, Driver, ExecResult, Row, TxHandle } from "@wrnexus/db";
+import { dbPermissionStore } from "../src/db.ts";
+
+/**
+ * A deterministic regression guard for C1/C2 (round-1 review): grant() used to
+ * wrap its delete-then-insert in db.tx, and the sqlite driver runs a bare
+ * BEGIN on one shared, unserialized connection - so an open transaction there
+ * could sweep in and discard a concurrent bare write from another method.
+ * Timing-based tests can't reliably prove the absence of that; this can,
+ * because it needs no concurrency at all - it just asserts the store never
+ * asks the driver to open a transaction in the first place.
+ */
+function makeFakeDb(): { db: Db; statements: string[]; transactionCalls: number } {
+  const statements: string[] = [];
+  const stats = { transactionCalls: 0 };
+
+  const driver: Driver = {
+    dialect: "sqlite" as Dialect,
+    async query(sql: string): Promise<Row[]> {
+      statements.push(sql);
+      return [];
+    },
+    async exec(sql: string): Promise<ExecResult> {
+      statements.push(sql);
+      return { changes: 0 };
+    },
+    async transaction<T>(fn: (tx: TxHandle) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+      // The spy: this must never be called by a transaction-free store.
+      stats.transactionCalls++;
+      statements.push("BEGIN");
+      return fn(driver);
+    },
+    close() {},
+  };
+
+  const db: Db = {
+    driver,
+    async all<T = Row>(sql: string): Promise<T[]> {
+      statements.push(sql);
+      return [];
+    },
+    async one<T = Row>(sql: string): Promise<T | null> {
+      statements.push(sql);
+      return null;
+    },
+    async exec(sql: string): Promise<ExecResult> {
+      statements.push(sql);
+      return { changes: 0 };
+    },
+    async tx<T>(fn: (tx: Db) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+      // Routed through the same driver.transaction spy a real Db would use.
+      return driver.transaction(() => fn(db));
+    },
+    async createTable() {},
+    close() {},
+  };
+
+  return {
+    db,
+    statements,
+    get transactionCalls() {
+      return stats.transactionCalls;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+describe("dbPermissionStore opens no transaction", () => {
+  test("the store opens no transaction: a shared-connection rollback would discard concurrent writes from other methods", async () => {
+    const fake = makeFakeDb();
+    const store = dbPermissionStore(fake.db);
+
+    await store.assignmentsFor("u1");
+    await store.assignRole("u1", "editor");
+    await store.revokeRole("u1", "editor");
+    await store.grant("u1", "post:write", "allow");
+    await store.revokeGrant("u1", "post:write");
+    await store.listSubjects();
+
+    expect(fake.transactionCalls).toBe(0);
+    for (const sql of fake.statements) {
+      expect(sql).not.toContain("BEGIN");
+    }
+  });
+});

packages/authz/test/store-conformance.ts

@@ -136,6 +136,15 @@ export function runStoreConformance(name: string, makeStore: () => Promise<Permi
       await expect(store.assignRole("g1", "admin", { tenantId: "" })).rejects.toThrow(/tenantId/);
     });
 
+    test("a non-string tenantId is refused", async () => {
+      // Same class as the empty-string case: the caller controls this value.
+      for (const bad of [null, 0, false, {}]) {
+        await expect(store.assignmentsFor("u1", { tenantId: bad as never })).rejects.toThrow(
+          /tenantId/,
+        );
+      }
+    });
+
     test("concurrent identical assignRole calls all resolve", async () => {
       // Check-then-act loses this race; the UNIQUE constraint then rejects
       // every loser even though the desired end state was already reached.