fix(rpc): close prototype-chain permission bypass, add server/client/transport tests

C1 CRITICAL: implement() looked up procedures/handlers with plain property
indexing, so any Object.prototype member name (constructor, toString, etc.)
resolved truthy and skipped the permission gate entirely. Fixed with
Object.hasOwn checks in packages/rpc/src/server.ts. Defense-in-depth guard
added in packages/dev-server/src/rpc-dispatch.ts constraining URL path
segments to a safe charset before they reach service/procedure lookups.

Added missing direct test coverage for packages/rpc/src/transport.ts,
server.ts and client.ts (previously untested), including a prototype-name
sweep in both server.test.ts and dev-server's rpc-endpoint.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-05 19:46:59 +05:30
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent fcf4ed3039
commit 7c4b484d0a
6 changed files with 468 additions and 4 deletions
+5 -2
View File
@@ -27,9 +27,12 @@ export async function handleRpcRequest(
if (!isInternalCaller(req)) return new Response("Not found", { status: 404 });
if (req.method !== "POST") return new Response("Method not allowed", { status: 405 });
const segments = url.pathname.split("/");
const service = segments[3] ? services.get(segments[3]) : undefined;
const SAFE_SEGMENT = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
const serviceName = segments[3];
const procedure = segments[4];
if (!service || !procedure || segments.length !== 5) {
const service =
serviceName && SAFE_SEGMENT.test(serviceName) ? services.get(serviceName) : undefined;
if (!service || !procedure || !SAFE_SEGMENT.test(procedure) || segments.length !== 5) {
return json({ ok: false, code: "RPC_UNKNOWN", message: "Unknown procedure", retryable: false });
}
let payload: unknown;
@@ -48,4 +48,29 @@ describe("RPC endpoint", () => {
expect(isInternalCaller(forwarded)).toBe(false);
expect((await handleRpcRequest(forwarded, new URL(forwarded.url), services))!.status).toBe(404);
});
describe("C1: prototype-chain procedure names cannot bypass the permission gate", () => {
const PROTO_NAMES = [
"constructor",
"toString",
"valueOf",
"hasOwnProperty",
"__proto__",
"isPrototypeOf",
];
for (const name of PROTO_NAMES) {
test(`"${name}" in the URL path yields RPC_UNKNOWN`, async () => {
const req = request(`/__wrnexus/rpc/demo/${name}`, { "x-wrnexus-internal": "1" });
const res = await handleRpcRequest(req, new URL(req.url), services);
expect(await res!.json()).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: "RPC_UNKNOWN" });
});
}
test(`"constructor" as the SERVICE segment also yields RPC_UNKNOWN`, async () => {
const req = request("/__wrnexus/rpc/constructor/add", { "x-wrnexus-internal": "1" });
const res = await handleRpcRequest(req, new URL(req.url), services);
expect(await res!.json()).toMatchObject({ ok: false, code: "RPC_UNKNOWN" });
});
});
});